פירוש על עבודה זרה 14:19

The context of this baraita is not exactly clear. Rashi says that it refers to robbers and ignoramuses who do teshuvah. According to R. Meir, if after doing teshuvah, they go back to their previous ways, they have lost the ability to be accepted again. In this view, backsliding is an unforgivable sin.
Judah says that if they go back to their previous way of acting with regard to secret matters, then we can no longer trust them. They are in essence acting one way in the public sphere and in another way in private. Such a person has lost all semblance of trustworthiness. But if they reverted in public, then they still have the opportunity to do teshuvah.
There is a second version of R. Judah’s statement. If when they did teshuvah, they observed even secret things, then they are accepted. But if when they did teshuvah, they only observed things in public, they are not accepted. Observing the laws in public and not in private is clearly hypocritical behavior.
Shimon and R. Joshua b. Korha say that those who do teshuvah are always accepted. And you will probably be glad to know, the halakhah follows this opinion.

Rabbi Ishmael states that not only is it forbidden to make transactions with non-Jews during the three days before a pagan holiday but it is also forbidden during the three days following the holiday. In the Palestinian Talmud two potential reasons are given for Rabbi Ishmael’s statement. The first is that non-Jews continue to celebrate for three days after their holidays are over and therefore these three days are also forbidden. The second is that if the non-Jew knows that he will not be able to conduct business with the Jew after his holiday, he will be depressed during his holiday and he will engage in less idol worship.
The sages prohibit only the three days preceding the holiday and not the three days following.

If one were to follow R. Ishmael’s ruling, it would always be forbidden to engage in business with idolaters because of Sunday. This is clearly a reference to early Christianity and indeed, in many manuscripts, the text does not say “Sunday” but “the day of the Nazarene.”

In reality, the sages who respond to R. Ishmael are probably the same sages whose opinion was in the first mishnah. Still, the Talmud perceives this format to be repetitive—why repeat their position twice? Thus it must be that there is some halakhic difference between the two positions. The Talmud will now take various disputes that appeared above or will appear below and claim that the sages of the mishnah disagree on these points as well.

The dispute between the two opinions is over whether the three day period includes the festival or does not.

This is another point we discussed before and that might be a difference between the two opinions.

Shmuel restricts the three day prohibition to the land of Israel. In the Diaspora, where idol worship does not, according to him, have such a great hold on the populace, the prohibition is only for one day. This is another possible point of dispute between the two opinions.

This is an even more innovative way of reading the dispute. Nahum the Mede disagrees with the mishnah—the prohibition is not for three days but for only one. Clearly, the first opinion in the Mishnah cannot agree with this. But the last opinion holds that only one day before the festival is prohibited.

The other rabbis wish to suppress Nahum the Mede’s opinion. It seems that they consider it too lenient.

In yesterday’s section the Talmud proposed that the other rabbis agree with Nahum the Mede. But these rabbis may be none other than Nahum the Mede himself.

There is a prohibition of selling large animals to idolaters. The issue seems to be that the idolater will use the animal on Shabbat. We will discuss this more later in the tractate. But Nahum the Mede allows one to sell an old horse during times of war, for such a horse will not have much use and may even end up killing its owner. People won’t learn from this rare case that it is permitted to sell large animals in general.

There seems to be another sage who holds the same opinion as Nahum the Mede. Ben Batera also allows selling a horse. But when we look deeper, we will see that they do not hold the same opinion. Ben Batera allows one to sell any horse to an idolater. This is because a horse’s work is to carry a rider, and carrying a rider is not considered work. But the other sages still prohibit selling horses, less one come to sell an ox, which pulls a plow. Nahum the Mede does not allow any horse, just old male horses. Thus he must hold like the other rabbis, and the other rabbis say that Nahum the Mede’s leniency should be hidden.

Only the edible portions of vegetables must be tithed. According to Nahum the Mede, all three parts of the dill plant are edible and therefore, all three must be tithed.

Eliezer seems to agree with Nahum—so why do the rabbis oppose him. The answer is that R. Eliezer refers only to the garden variety of dill. Wild dill does not require tithing for all three parts.

Aha b. Minyomi is not pleased that the sages from Palestine respond in each instance to Nahum the Mede, a sage from the region of Babylonia/Medea, with “let the matter be suppressed and left unsaid.” Abaye responds by saying that there is one case in which we do follow his ruling—one should make a special request for one’s needs while reciting the “who hears prayer” blessing, which is part of the daily Amidah.

Aha b. Minyomi says that in the case of when one asks God for his needs, we are not following Nahum the Mede but actually other great rabbis (strong ropes). This introduces a baraita in which R. Eliezer and R. Joshua argue over whether one should first ask for one’s needs and then pray, or the opposite. Each rabbi supports his opinion with a verse. Note, that R. Nahum the Mede’s opinion has not yet been cited.

Each rabbi now interprets how he would read the verse that the other rabbi cited as evidence.

The Talmud now suggests that the dispute between R. Joshua and R. Eliezer was really connected to whether we learn from Moses’s behavior. Moses first praised God and then he asked for his needs. R. Joshua says that we too should act in the same manner. But R. Eliezer says that Moses is different. His greatness allows him to sincerely praise God first. But with any other human being, it is better to simply first ask for one’s needs.